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We analyze locational policy coordination in the metropolitan regions of secondary capital cities. 
Secondary capital cities – defined as capitals that are not the primary economic city of their nation 
states – serve as the political center of their nation states, however, they must simultaneously 
explore new ways to develop their own regional economies. Locational policies, and their regional 
coordination, aim to strengthen the economic competitiveness of metropolitan regions. Our 
comparison of the metropolitan regions of Bern, Ottawa-Gatineau, The Hague, and Washington, 
D.C., reveals that vertical institutional fragmentation, together with high local tax autonomy,
create an unlevel playing field, which prompts jurisdictions to behave fiercely in regional tax 
competition. These findings are troubling for secondary capital cities given their propensity to be 
located in fragmented metropolitan regions and the capital city-specific local tax autonomy 
constraints imposed on them. 
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Introduction 
Secondary capital cities (SCCs) are capitals that are not the primary economic city of their 
nation states. Originally, SCCs were established to serve the interests of their nation state, and 
they were expected to abstain from commercial and economic aspirations. James Madison, the 
political theorist and fourth President of the United States (U.S.), argued in The Federalist 
Papers, no. 43 that the Federal District should be small in size and its development should be 
minimal (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 1982, 218). Small local governing structures, such as 
federal districts or city-states, are often created for SCCs in order to prevent second-tier political 
entities, like states, provinces, or cantons, from having authority over the nation’s capital. This 
practice increases the likelihood that SCCs’ metropolitan regions will span over multiple sub-
national borders (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). In addition, smaller cities are often selected 
as capitals with the aim of uniting a country. Therefore, SCCs are prone to being located in 
areas of national tensions and these tensions tend to be mirrored by institutional fragmentation 
in the respective metropolitan region. 
The traditional conceptualization of SCCs, as cities without economic aspirations, is 
increasingly challenged by growing pressure from economic globalization, which pushes SCCs 
and their regional economies into interurban competition, just like any other metropolitan 
region. As a consequence, policy-makers in SCCs have begun to formulate locational policies 
in order to become competitive – yet specialized – nodes in a globalized economy (Kaufmann 
2018; Mayer, Sager, Kaufmann, and Warland 2018). In this article, we study the institutional 
drivers of locational policy coordination in the metropolitan regions of secondary capital cities. 
The study of SCCs is becoming more practically relevant given the many current capital city 
relocation projects, such as the establishment of Oyala as the new capital of Equatorial Guinea, 
Naypyidaw as the new capital of Myanmar, and Putrajaya as the new Malaysian federal 
administrative capital. Formerly colonized nations are especially eager to break with their 
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colonial ties by building new capital cities that symbolize their independence (Rossman 2017). 
SCCs can be found on every continent, with famous examples in Africa (e.g. Pretoria, Abuja), 
Asia (e.g. Jerusalem, Islamabad), Oceania (e.g. Wellington, Canberra), Europe (e.g. Berlin, The 
Hague), North America (e.g. Washington, D.C., Ottawa) and South America (e.g. Brasilia, 
Sucre). In most cases, SCCs are not infant capitals or capital cities that failed to develop 
properly. Instead, they were often deliberately chosen to exert a primarily regulative, balancing, 
or symbolic role with the original idea that they should refrain from aspiring to become 
economic powerhouses (Mayer, Sager, Kaufmann, and Warland 2016). However, increasing 
international interurban competition has pressured SCCs to forgo their dependence on their 
respective nation states and to formulate locational policies become competitive in the 
international economic arena in their own right.  
Locational policies aim to strengthen the competitiveness of a locality or a region. Locational 
policies are more effective if they are coordinated between jurisdictions in the entire 
metropolitan region (Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009, 256). Coordination aims to ensure 
coherent policy-making by creating synergies and by reducing confronting strategies in the 
region (Keating 1995; Sager 2004). However, coordination is often hindered by collective 
action dilemmas, such as high transaction costs or free riding (Ostrom 1990).  
We apply a heuristic proposed by Scharpf (1994), which conceptualizes coordination as a 
welfare-theoretic concept that has the potential to achieve higher aggregated welfare in a region 
through aligned action and strategically coordinated moves. We outline a theoretical framework 
that employs two institutional explanatory factors to explain locational policy coordination in 
the metropolitan regions of SCCs: institutional fragmentation within the metropolitan region 
and local tax autonomy. Policy coordination tends to be problematic in capital city regions due 
to the high likelihood of regional institutional fragmentation and capital cities’ specific 
restrictions on employing tax instruments (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009, 305-306). To better 
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understand locational policy coordination in SCCs, we apply a theory-driven comparative case 
study design that compares the four SCC metropolitan regions of Bern, Ottawa-Gatineau, The 
Hague and Washington, D.C.  
As we outline during the course of this article, there are at least three reasons that make 
locational policy coordination in SCCs relevant. First, systematic research about SCCs is 
lacking. Second, the category of SCCs enables us to study specific regional economies that are 
characterized by a strong public presence. Third, the academic literature often treats SCCs as 
objects of the nation state and thereby neglects the processes through which they actively seek 
to increase their economic competitiveness. On a theoretical level, this article contributes to 
recent debates on policy integration (e.g. Nordbeck and Steurer 2016) and policy coordination 
(e.g. Cejudo and Michel 2017), as well as to the still relevant debates about local tax competition 
and coordination in metropolitan regions (e.g. Keating 1995; Savitch and Vogel 2009).  
In the following section, we discuss SCCs and their locational policy efforts before turning to 
the theoretical framework. We find that there is greater coordination of locational policies in 
instances of both low vertical institutional fragmentation and low local tax autonomy. We 
suggest that an interaction effect is at work. High local tax autonomy has the greatest negative 
effect on coordination in metropolitan regions that have high vertical institutional fragmentation 
because this fragmentation creates an unlevel playing field for tax competition. In the 
conclusion, we discuss the practical implications of these findings for SCCs. 
Why secondary capital cities coordinate locational policies 
Both Campbell (2000) and Hall (2006) categorize capital cities by differentiating between their 
political and economic roles. Hall (2006) creates, among other categories, a category for global 
capitals, such as London and Tokyo, multi-functional capitals, such as Paris and Moscow, and 
political capitals, such as Washington, D.C. and Bern. Among other categories, Campbell 
(2000) distinguishes between the capital as the dominant economic city in the nation state (such 
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as Paris or Copenhagen) and the capital as a secondary city (such as Ottawa or Canberra) and 
emphasizes the economic status and relative position of the capital within its respective nation’s 
urban system. Whereas its political role is attached to its capital city status, “there is no rule that 
a political capital automatically attracts concomitant economic functions” (Hall 2006, 10). 
Building on Campbell (2000) and Hall (2006), we define a SCC as the capital city of a nation 
that has at least one other city that is economically more important to it than the capital city.  
Capital city research stemming from political science mostly focuses on the political 
interactions between different levels of government and on the conflict these cities face between 
serving the interests of the nation as a whole and those of their local residents (e.g. Rowat 1973; 
Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). Despite the “high interest in economic development efforts 
involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions” (Feiock, Steinacker, 
and Park 2009, 256), no study, thus far, tackles these issues in SCCs.  
As in any other city, SCCs try to strengthen their economic competitiveness by formulating 
locational policies (Kaufmann 2018; Mayer et al. 2018). Examples of locational policies 
include: innovation policies that facilitate knowledge flows between crucial actors in a region, 
image building strategies that aim to craft a brand for the locality, the development of crucial 
infrastructure projects, strategies to attract firms and efforts to tap into upper-tier governmental 
funds (Kaufmann and Arnold 2018). Locational policies are formulated based on local assets, 
which explains why capital cities largely rely on their capital city status when devising 
locational policies (Kaufmann 2018). 
An institutionalist approach to policy coordination 
The phenomenon to be explained is the coordination of locational policies within the 
metropolitan regions of SCCs. Coordination is a process that occurs within an institutional 
setting (Koch 2013). Therefore, we have developed an institutionalist theoretical framework to 
approach the coordination of locational policies in SCC regions. Since a comparative urban 
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research agenda requires some degree of reductionism (Pierre 2005, 447), the theoretical 
framework consists of two institutional explanatory factors that we expect to explain locational 
policies coordination. Our institutional perspective is Fritz Scharpf’s (1997) actor-centered 
institutionalism (ACI) that focuses on formal institutions and perceives them as both enabling 
and restricting conditions for actor behavior. To understand actor behavior within institutional 
settings, we adhere to Olsen (2001, 193): “Actors behave in accordance with their interpretation 
of rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted.” 
Drawing on the findings of an extensive comparison of eleven capital cities (Slack and 
Chattopadhyay 2009), the two institutional explanatory factors selected are institutional 
fragmentation in metropolitan regions and local tax autonomy.  
Phenomenon to be explained: coordination of locational policies 
Instead of focusing on coordination within governments (e.g. Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 
2016), we analyze coordination between governments in a metropolitan region. Coordination 
can be understood as a process whose successful outcome is policy coherence (Cejudo and 
Michel 2017; Nordbeck and Steurer 2016). We approach the coordination of locational policies 
using a heuristic of Scharpf: “[Coordination] is considered desirable whenever the level of 
aggregate welfare obtained through the unilateral choices of interdependent actors is lower than 
the level which could be obtained through choices that are jointly considered” (Scharpf 1994, 
27).  
Institutional collective action dilemmas arise when the decisions taken by one government 
impact other governments and their policies. Different coordination structures may address 
collective action dilemmas. Feiock (2013) differentiates coordination structures by their 
integration mechanisms and the scope of the policy fields that they aim to coordinate. For 
example, councils of governments are a type of coordination structure based on statutes that 
only incorporate a few policy fields, such as public transportation, planning, and/or locational 
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policies. Looser types of coordination structures include informal networks or service contracts 
that often arise as alternatives to more institutionalized coordination structures. Empirical 
studies reveal that effective coordination is often achieved through cooperative arrangements 
that stabilize the networks of policy-relevant actors, and not through institutionalized 
coordination structures (Sager 2005; Sager 2006). 
Peterson (1981) suggests that locational policies within a city are politically uncontested 
because local public and local private actors share an interest in economic development. 
However, the increased international urban competition scaled-up the relevant competing units 
from cities to metropolitan regions (Hall and Pain 2006). Thus, locational policies have a 
transboundary characteristic, which can make them politically contested in the metropolitan 
region. Efforts to coordinate locational policies at the metropolitan level are often motivated by 
a metropolitan-wide common interest to promote the location (Kübler and Piliutyte 2007, 365; 
Morgan 2014, 314). Feiock, Steinacker, and Park (2009, 256) emphasize the potential benefits 
of regional coordination in economic development policies, but they also add that “the 
transaction costs tend to be correspondingly high, making economic development one of the 
toughest cases for institutional collective action”. The transboundary characteristic of locational 
policies makes them subject to regional politics as “cooperation results from bargaining and 
negotiating among the officials of affected jurisdictions” (Dowding and Feiock 2012, 37). The 
political games involved in locational policies coordination are likely to be more intense in 
federalist settings due to the high local autonomy that federalism attributes to subnational 
governments. Furthermore, political games are likely to be more intense in metropolitan regions 
that have high institutional fragmentation because local governments in the core cities of 
Western countries tend to be ruled by political parties that differ from those of the local 
governments in the suburbs (Sellers, Kübler, Walter-Rogg, and Walks, 2013).  
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We operationalize the coordination of locational policies within metropolitan regions with a 
heuristic inspired mainly by Scharpf (1994; 1997), which distinguishes between two categories 
of coordination. In addition, we propose a third category, coordination failure, as the worst-case 
scenario for coordination. The first category, positive coordination, describes a proactive search 
for synergies and for a common welfare that is better than would be possible through individual 
action. The outcome of positive coordination process would be policy coherence. Second, 
negative coordination, refers to the mere avoidance of contradictory action and redundancies 
without actively generating synergies. Negative coordination does not aim to achieve policy 
coherence, but it does seek to avoid unilateral action that could harm the interest of other 
jurisdictions in the metropolitan region. Third, coordination failure, can include beggar-my-
neighbor behavior of different localities within a region (Keating 1995, 120), as well as the 
absence of any coordination, meaning that coordination as a process would never even had 
begun. 
Explanatory factor one: institutional fragmentation  
Policy coordination between actors in a metropolitan region is conditioned by the mismatch 
between functional integrated regions and jurisdictional territories. Governing institutionally 
fragmented metropolitan regions requires coordination among governments (Kübler, Sager, and 
Schwab 2005). Morgan (2014) argues that institutional fragmentation in metropolitan regions, 
i.e. administrative area boundaries, is a considerable barrier to coordinated locational policies. 
We distinguish between horizontal and vertical dimensions of institutional fragmentation. The 
horizontal dimension represents the quantity of local governments in a metropolitan region. We 
expect that horizontal fragmentation (a greater number of local jurisdictions in a metropolitan 
region) hinders coordination because it increases collective action problems, such as transaction 
costs or opportunities to free ride. The vertical dimension represents the presence of upper-tier 
governmental entities in a metropolitan region. Metropolitan regions may be integrated within 
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a single state, province or canton, or they may be divided by multiple upper-tier governmental 
entities. We expect that vertical institutional fragmentation hinders coordination because, in 
such a case, different local governments belong to different lines of political authority. For 
example in Switzerland, policy coordination in vertical institutional fragmented metropolitan 
regions is difficult because the cantons occupy the most powerful role in Swiss policy-making 
(Sager, Ingold, and Balthasar 2017).  
Vertical institutional fragmentation, in particular, is often an issue in SCCs for two reasons. 
First, the cities chosen as capitals are often selected due to their prospect of uniting a nation 
state and are thus located in areas of national tension. For example, the choice of Ottawa to 
bridge Anglophone and Francophone Canada. Second, in some cases, specific governing 
structures (e.g. federal districts) were created for capitals that are relatively small-scale and 
which only cover the core city of the capital region. For example, the metropolitan region of 
Washington, D.C. is highly fragmented, as it incorporates the District of Columbia and three 
additional states (Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia), which are in turn home to various 
local jurisdictions.  
Explanatory factor two: local tax autonomy 
The national tax system determines a jurisdictions’ ability to raise income (Page and Goldsmith 
1987, 7). The degree of local tax autonomy can be operationalized (1) by the availability of tax 
instruments and (2) by the proportion of all national tax revenue that is collected at the local 
level. High local autonomy means that local governments have a variety of tax instruments at 
hand, such as personal income tax, corporate income tax and property tax on land and real 
estate. Importantly, local jurisdictions have the discretion to set their own tax rates, which may 
differ considerably between jurisdictions in the same metropolitan region. In a low local tax 
autonomy context, some of these tax instruments are the prerogative of higher-tier political 
entities. To compensate for these limitations on local tax instruments, substantial public money 
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is transferred from higher-tier political entities to finance local budgets (Goldsmith 2012, 137). 
The proportion of all national tax revenue collected at the local level is a straightforward 
measurement of local tax autonomy (Sellers and Lidström 2007, 616-618). We expect that the 
availability of tax instruments and the proportion of tax revenue at the local level are positively 
correlated. 
We expect that local governments with far reaching tax rights will take full advantage of their 
tax rights. High local tax autonomy enables them to lower taxes or award tax incentives. In a 
high tax autonomy setting, local governments have powerful incentives to compete against each 
other in order to attract residents, firms, and other taxable capital (Keating 1995). Thus, tax 
competition is likely to trump locational policy coordination. Hence, we expect that high local 
tax autonomy constrains the coordination of locational policies, whereas low tax autonomy 
enables coordination.  
Capital city-specific local tax autonomy constraints are important in the context of this article. 
For example, Washington, D.C., as the U.S. Federal District, does not enjoy the same tax rights 
as other U.S. states. Washington, D.C. cannot tax commuters that work in the District of 
Columbia but reside outside of it. Furthermore, tax exemptions on property belonging to the 
national government and to foreign governments (such as embassies or consulates) limit capital 
cities’ local property tax base. Unsurprisingly, this property tax exemption has the greatest 
financial consequences in capital city regions. These tax losses are severe for local budgets that 
rely on property tax as the most important local tax instrument, such as in Ottawa or The Hague.  
Propositions 
The two explanatory factors, together with the operationalization of coordination, yield four 
possible proposition configurations, which are illustrated in Table 1. In line with the ACI, we 
distinguish between enabling and constraining institutional settings: “political interaction is 
driven by the interactive strategies of purposive actors operating within institutional settings 
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that, at the same time, enable and constrain these strategies” (Scharpf 1997, 36). As proposed 
in the ACI, the institutional framework is a context condition alongside situational factors and 
the non-institutional context, such as geographic and economic factors. Thus, additional 
explanatory factors are taken into account in the case studies.  
TABLE 1 
Propositions 
Institutional 
fragmentation 
High 
 
 
 
Negative coordination Coordination failure  
 
 
 
Low 
Positive coordination Negative coordination 
 Low High 
Local tax autonomy 
 
Research design 
We employ a comparative multiple case study design that includes four SCC regions in Western 
countries, namely Bern, Ottawa-Gatineau, The Hague, and Washington, D.C. The four cases 
constitute a theory-driven sample in order to “maximize the variance of the independent 
variable[s] and to minimize the variance of the control variables” (Lijphart 1975, 165). Since 
the study of capital cities is inherently a study of exceptions (Campbell 2000, 22), we restrict 
ourselves to four SCCs in OECD countries.1 This enables us to control for some of the economic 
and political context while allowing for variance in the two proposed explanatory factors. Thus, 
our research design juxtaposes a cross-case analysis with a within-case analysis. The latter 
analysis tests theoretically derived propositions and is mostly based on interview data. 
                                                          
1 There are ten SCCs in the 34 OECD countries: Canberra, Australia; Ottawa, Canada; Berlin, Germany; Jerusalem, 
Israel; Rome, Italy, The Hague, The Netherlands; Wellington, New Zealand; Bern, Switzerland; Ankara, Turkey; 
Washington, D.C., United States. 
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Together, these two inferential strategies allow for reliable causal inferences (Collier and Brady 
2010, 10).  
Figure 1 depicts the maps of the four metropolitan regions under scrutiny. The maps 
demonstrate vertical and horizontal institutional fragmentation in the four metropolitan regions. 
The metropolitan region of Bern consists of 29 municipalities that all belong to the Canton of 
Bern. The metropolitan region of Ottawa-Gatineau consists of 15 cities, townships and 
municipalities (twelve belong to Quebec and three belong to Ontario). It is divided at its core 
between the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. In the metropolitan region of The Hague, all six 
local governments belong to the province of South Holland. The metropolitan region of 
Washington, D.C. consists of 23 counties and cities, as well as the District of Columbia, and 
spans over three states, in addition to the District of Columbia.  
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FIGURE 1 
Maps of the selected SCCs’ metropolitan regions 
 
Note:  These maps were created by Alexander Hermann (University of Bern) and were first published in the book The Political Economy of Capital Cities, by Mayer et al. 
(2018). London: Routledge. The maps are reprinted by permission of the copyright holders Alexander Hermann and Heike Mayer. 
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The second explanatory factor, local tax autonomy, is concerned with the tax instruments 
available to local governments and the proportion of tax revenue collected at the local level (for 
the latter see OECD 2014). The U.S. and Switzerland both have high tax autonomy – around 
15% of all tax revenue is raised at the local level. In Switzerland, local governments are allowed 
to levy personal income tax, corporate income tax and property tax, among others. They can set 
their own tax rates. In the U.S., state law determines the tax instruments available to local 
governments. For example, jurisdictions in Virginia are allowed to raise property and sales 
taxes, whereas jurisdictions in Maryland are allowed to collect personal income and property 
taxes. In Canada, local governments raise 9% of all taxes, and they are only allowed to collect 
property tax. In the Netherlands, local governments only raise 3.6% of all taxes, and they are 
only allowed to collect property tax.  
Table 2 summarizes the four cases. Table 3 displays the cases’ variances in the two explanatory 
factors and allocates the cases to the propositions in Table 1.  
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TABLE 2 
Summary of selected cases 
Type of factor Factor Bern Ottawa-
Gatineau 
The Hague Washington, 
D.C. 
Control factor Type of capital 
city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Control factor Type of country Western 
OECD country 
Western 
OECD 
country 
Western 
OECD country 
Western 
OECD 
country 
Context factor Inhabitants of 
capital city 
131,554 957,148 514,861 672,228 
Context factor Inhabitants of 
metropolitan 
region 
314,223 1,332,001 838,015 6,097,684 
Context factor 
 
State type Federal state Federal state Decentralized 
unitary state 
Federal state 
Explanatory factor 
one 
Institutional 
fragmentation 
 
- Horizontal 
 
 
 
- Vertical 
Ambivalent 
 
 
- High 
30 local 
governments 
 
- Low 
All local 
governments 
within the 
same canton 
Rather high 
 
 
- Rather low 
15 local 
governments 
 
- High 
Provincial 
boundaries at 
the very core 
Low 
 
 
- Low 
6 local 
governments 
 
- Low 
All local 
governments 
within the 
same province 
High 
 
 
- High 
24 local 
governments 
 
- High 
 Three states 
and the 
District of 
Columbia 
Explanatory factor 
two 
Local tax 
autonomy 
- Availability of 
tax instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Share of local 
tax revenue 
High 
 
- Personal 
income tax, 
corporate 
income tax, 
property tax 
 
 
 
- 15.2% 
Rather low 
 
- Property tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 9.7% 
Low 
 
- Property tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 3.6% 
High 
 
-Property tax; 
Personal 
income tax, 
and sales and 
use tax 
determined by 
state law 
 
- 15.9% 
Phenomenon 
to be explained 
Coordination of 
locational 
policies 
? ? ? ? 
 
Sources: Population data (all from 2015) and definitions of the metropolitan regions: Bern: MS region 11 defined 
by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Ottawa-Gatineau: ‘census metropolitan area’ Ottawa-Gatineau defined by 
Statistics Canada. The Hague: Agglomeratie ’s-Gravenhage, COROP region (=NUTS NL332) defined by Statistics 
Netherlands. Washington, D.C.: Washington-Arlington-Alexandria (DC-VA-MD-WV) metropolitan statistical 
area (FIPS MSA Code 8840), defined by the United States Office of Management and Budget. Local tax revenue: 
OECD 2014 tax autonomy indicators (data from 2011).  
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TABLE 3 
Variance in the two explanatory variables in the cases  
Institutional 
fragmentation 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
                         Ottawa-Gatineau 
             Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
      The Hague 
 
 
 
 Low High 
Local tax autonomy 
 
Note: Distances only serve illustrative purposes and do not imply observed values 
 
Data collection includes secondary quantitative and qualitative data, document analysis, and 
semi-structured, in-person interviews. The backbone of the within-case analysis consists of 91 
interviews with 103 relevant decision-makers in the four SCCs. Interview partners were 
carefully selected in order to ensure sufficient variety within the cases and consistency between 
them. The interviews took place during field studies of a minimum duration of three-months in 
all four SCCs. Table 4 provides an overview of the interviews. 
TABLE 4  
Overview of the interviews in all four SCCs 
 
Type of interviewee 
Bern Ottawa-
Gatineau 
The Hague Washington, 
D.C. 
Total 
- Public Official 
(local, second-tier and 
national government) 
6 5 9 8 28 
- Economic development 
agent 
- Regional coordination 
agent 
3 6 4 4 17 
- Business actor 
- Private interest group 
representative 
7 6 5 8 26 
- Expert 
- Academic 
3 4 6 7 20 
Total 19 21 24 27 91 
 
 
             Bern 
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Bern 
We expected to observe negative coordination due to ambiguous institutional fragmentation, 
i.e. high horizontal institutional fragmentation, low vertical institutional fragmentation and high 
local tax autonomy. The findings do not support our proposition. Despite the presence of an 
established coordination structure in the metropolitan region, there is no coordination of 
locational policies and there is moderate competition for attracting residents.  
Although Bern was once very powerful – at its pinnacle (1500-1800) it was the largest European 
city-state north of the Alps – it has consistently lost ground to other economic powerhouses in 
the Swiss urban system. When judged by various demographic and economic measures, Bern 
is eclipsed by the much larger, and economically more prosperous Swiss metropolitan region 
of Zurich, Geneva-Lausanne and Basel (Kaufmann, Warland, Mayer, and Sager 2016). 
Business actors believe that the absence of coordination in Bern’s metropolitan region is one of 
the major causes of Bern’s declining importance (Interviews: 2 & 5).  
Municipalities in Bern’s metropolitan region are embedded in a council of government 
organization called the Regional Conference (Regionalkonferenz Bern-Mittelland), which is 
mostly active in the fields of public transport infrastructure and land-use planning. There is a 
subdivision of the Regional Conference, the Sub-Conference Economy (Teilkonferenz 
Wirtschaft), which is responsible for coordinating economic policies. However, neither 
organization is able to foster profound locational policy coordination. A politician explains the 
Regional Conference’s weakness: 
The regional conference has too few responsibilities and it is limited in its effectiveness. I see the 
Regional Conference and its sub-conference as a paper tiger. The important political decisions 
are still being made in the municipalities (Interview 13). 
Similarly, van der Heiden (2010, 45) posits that jurisdictions in the Bern metropolitan region 
are not interested in coordinating their international strategies. Additionally, there is moderate 
18 
tax competition between municipalities for attracting residents. However, when it comes to 
attracting firms, both the mayor of Bern and the economic development officer of Köniz – the 
second largest municipality in the metropolitan region of Bern – agree that their municipalities 
benefit if a firm settles anywhere in the metropolitan region (Interviews: 11 & 18). In sum, 
although regional coordination structures exist, we did not find coordinated locational policies. 
Low vertical institutional fragmentation, due to the single upper-tier entity of the Canton of 
Bern, explains the presence of a coordination structure in the metropolitan region of Bern. 
However, interviewees point to three reasons for the absence of coordination of locational 
policies and the competition for attracting residents. First, due to high local tax autonomy, 
municipalities can set their own tax rates and, therefore, they moderately compete for residents 
(Interviews: 5, 13, 15 & 19). The tax instruments available to municipalities, such as the tax on 
personal income, make residents an important tax base. For example, personal income tax in 
the city of Bern comprises 42.5% of the local budget revenue (Federal Finance Administration 
2016). Second, municipalities resist anything that could potentially constrain their autonomy 
(Interviews: 5 & 13). A local politician declares that “local autonomy is a sacred cow in Bern” 
(Interview 18). This is also well documented by van der Heiden (2010) who observes that 
decision-makers in agglomeration municipalities are unwilling to restrict their political 
autonomy in favor of collective action. Third, interviewees mention a partisan divide between 
the agglomeration’s municipalities and the core city. Whereas the city of Bern is a political 
stronghold of the Social Democrats and the Green Party, municipalities in the agglomeration 
are dominated by moderate-right and conservative-right parties (Interviews: 1, 5, 7 & 13).  
Ottawa-Gatineau 
We expected to find negative coordination due to institutional fragmentation at the heart of the 
metropolitan region and low local tax autonomy. However, as in Bern, there is no coordination 
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of locational policies in the metropolitan region of Ottawa-Gatineau. Thus, the findings do not 
support our proposition.  
Ottawa was a farm and lumber town before it was chosen as Canada’s capital in 1867. After 
the two World Wars, Ottawa’s dominant economic sector changed from the primary sector 
(forestry) to the public sector. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, Ottawa’s economy 
boomed thanks to its innovative high-tech sector. The burst of the dot.com bubble in the early 
2000s made the public sector the region’s largest employer once again and marked the sharp 
end of Ottawa’s short economic rise. The collapse of the high-tech sector put locational policies 
high on Ottawa’s political agenda (Andrew and Doloreux 2014, 142-144).  
Ottawa amalgamated with eleven smaller Ontarian municipalities in 2001. The neighboring 
Quebecois city of Gatineau was formed in 2002 through an amalgamation of five 
municipalities. As a consequence, the cities of Ottawa and Gatineau became powerful and 
distinctly urban in comparison to their rural neighboring municipalities. Since 1968, the federal 
government has attempted to enhance its presence in Quebec by shifting federal offices and 
cultural facilities across the river to Gatineau. However, neither the amalgamation, nor federal 
presence in Gatineau has encouraged the coordination of any policies between Ottawa and 
Gatineau (Interviews: 47 & 54).  
Economic development agencies in Ottawa and Gatineau (Invest Ottawa and Développement 
économique - CLD Gatineau) do not coordinate their locational policies with their counterparts 
on the other side of the Ottawa River. The same is true for economic interest organizations, like 
the Chambers of Commerce or the Business Improvement Districts (Interviews: 50, 57 & 61). 
This absence of coordination is described metaphorically by several interview partners: 
− The Ottawa River is wider politically than it is physically (Interview 45).  
− Ottawa was chosen as the capital city to bridge Anglophone and the Francophone 
Canada, but it cannot live up to this task (Interview 54). 
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− People are talking about Ottawa and Gatineau as the two solitudes (Interview 53). 
The absence of coordination can largely be explained by vertical institutional fragmentation. 
This is reflected in very basic problems: Neither local government can engage in activities that 
would spending one jurisdiction’s taxpayers’ dollars on a project that would uniquely benefit 
the other jurisdiction. This vertical institutional fragmentation also includes different political 
systems and issues regarding Quebec’s status within Canada (Interviews: 58). We can see 
Canada’s very political struggles manifest themselves in its capital city region. The political 
dilemma surrounding Ottawa-Gatineau leads an expert to conclude that “Ottawa is probably 
the hardest capital city region to govern” (Interview 58). Despite the vertical institutional 
fragmentation, we did not find competition or beggar-my-neighbor behavior. The limited tax 
instruments available to Canadian municipalities prevent an outbreak of tax competition over 
firms or residents. Fragmentation in the metropolitan region is not limited to provincial borders. 
The two core municipalities – Ottawa and Gatineau – do not cooperate with the remaining 
municipalities in their respective provinces. This can be explained by geography and, more 
precisely, by the urban/rural divide. The economic bases of the two core municipalities and the 
remaining rural municipalities are so diverse that coordinating locational policies does not make 
much sense.  
The Hague 
We expected to find positive coordination of locational policies due to low institutional 
fragmentation and low local tax autonomy. The findings support our proposition.  
The Hague is deeply embedded in the huge polycentric metropolitan region called Randstad. 
The Hague is mostly studied in the context of its international organizations (e.g. van Krieken 
and McKay 2005). However, it also hosts most national government organizations, such as the 
Dutch Parliament, the Cabinet of the Netherlands and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. 
Thus, the presence of the public sector provides The Hague with a distinct economic profile 
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that is complementary to the other major cities of the Randstad (Meijers, Hoogerbrugge, Louw, 
Priemus, and Spaans 2014, 92).  
Until its termination at the end of 2014, the City-Region Haaglanden, which included The 
Hague and eight neighboring municipalities, served as the political coordination structure for 
environmental issues, spatial planning and locational policies. At the beginning of 2015, the 
two City-Regions of Rotterdam and Haaglanden merged into the Metropolitan Region of 
Rotterdam The Hague (MRTH). This new coordination structure encompasses 2.2 Million 
inhabitants, consists of 23 municipalities, employs around 100 staff members and is an 
internationally significant economic region. The establishment of the MRTH was initialized by 
the mayors of Rotterdam and The Hague in 2010 (Interviews: 32 & 22). The MRTH is a 
powerful player, which is exemplified by the Dutch government’s decision to allocate its 
transportation funds directly to the MRTH (Meijers et al. 2014, 93). Beyond public 
transportation, the MRTH seeks to strengthen its economic competitiveness by coordinating 
locational policies (Interview 43).  
Three reasons explain the positive coordination of locational policies in the case of The Hague. 
First, all of the municipalities that cooperate within the MRTH belong to the province of South 
Holland (Zuid-Holland). The establishment of the MRTH was a strategic move carried out by 
Rotterdam and The Hague to gain more autonomy from the province of South Holland 
(Interviews: Meijers, Schuttenbeld). The economic development director of the MRTH 
explains:  
We have to redefine the relationship with the province. The hierarchical structure of the three state 
levels does not match the realities anymore. The mayors of the big four cities have a direct line to 
the Prime Minister (Interview 43).  
Indeed, provinces are the least powerful of the three state levels in the Netherlands and the 
major Dutch cities “often view the provinces as unwelcome representatives of the smaller 
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municipalities that surround them” (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 212–213). As a consequence, 
the MRTH was initiated by the province’s two biggest cities with noticeably less political 
commitment from the mayors of the smaller municipalities. Second, low local tax autonomy 
facilitates the coordination of locational policies. Rotterdam and The Hague see each other 
rather as complementary parts than as competitors (Interview van Loon). The municipalities 
still compete to acquire firms. However, compared to cases with high local tax autonomy, 
competition is transparent and is mostly based on complementary clusters of firms. 
Furthermore, there is a gentlemen’s agreement that forbids the so-called poaching of firms 
(Interviews: 33, 42, & 43). Third, the special polycentric setting of the Randstad makes 
coordination very attractive because it provides ample opportunities to ‘borrow size’ (Burger, 
Meijers, Hoogerbrugge, and Tresserra 2015). An expert explains: 
The Hague is not a complete city. It does not have a labor market of its own and the residents of 
The Hague can profit from a lot of cultural opportunities in other cities and vice versa. (Interview 
32).  
Only together with other cities in the Randstad is The Hague able to provide a sufficient critical 
mass to support a wide range of metropolitan functions and to be competitive in interurban 
competition (Meijers et al. 2014, 98–99).  
Washington, D.C. 
We expected to find coordination failure because of its high institutional fragmentation and 
high local tax autonomy. The findings support our proposition. 
Establishing the capital city in Washington, D.C. in 1800 was an intentional move to insulate 
the newly founded republic’s federal government from the influence of any state or commercial 
center (Ghandi, Yilmaz, Zahradnik, and Edwards 2009, 271). Since the founding of the capital, 
the presence of the federal government has fostered impressive economic development for the 
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entire metropolitan region. An expert sees a “direct correlation between the regions’ GDP and 
federal spending” (Interview 71).  
The Greater Washington Initiative (GWI), a public-private partnership mostly funded by the 
different jurisdictions of the region, was tasked until 2010 with coordinating locational policies 
in the metropolitan region. Whereas the smaller jurisdictions appreciated the GWI’s 
standardized services, the larger jurisdictions (such as Arlington, Alexandria, Fairfax, or 
Montgomery) pursued their own locational policy activities while they were part of the GWI 
(Interviews: 72, 78 & 87). In 2010, some larger jurisdictions stopped funding the initiative, 
which led to the dissolution of the GWI in that same year. Currently, two organizations remain 
to tackle the coordination of locational policies. One is the informal network Commission of 
Economic Development Officials (CEDO), which connects different jurisdictions’ economic 
development agents. However, the purpose of the CEDO is to share information and best 
practices, not to coordinate policies (Interview 67). The other organization is the Metropolitan 
Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG), which focuses on transportation, land-use 
planning and environmental issues. The MWCOG seeks to coordinate some locational polices, 
for example the region’s cyber security activities, however, it struggles to obtain jurisdictions’ 
support in this policy area (Interview 66). Neither the CEDO nor the MWCOG have been able 
to fill the vacuum that resulted following the termination of the GWI. 
All interviewees agree that there is fierce within competition regarding firm acquisition and the 
attraction of taxpayers in the Washington, D.C metropolitan region. A so-called non-poaching 
agreement exists between the jurisdictions, however, they have been unable to agree upon a 
new non-poaching agreement (Interviews: 67 & 78). Even though poaching has been 
condemned in many interviews, the non-poaching agreement only has a limited impact because 
firms are aware of the obvious competition, and they approach the different jurisdictions 
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directly or via brokers (Interviews: 72, 77 & 90). For example, an economic development agent 
explains her strategy: 
We did an analysis in which we identified our strong economic clusters and potential clusters that 
are present in other jurisdictions, but that we do not have. We should have our fair share as well in 
these clusters. So, it is a strategy of ‘guarding’ our companies and ‘going after’ new firms and 
organizations (Interview 72). 
Another example that illustrates the regional competition over firms and organizations is the 
relocation of the U.S. National Science Foundation from Arlington to neighboring Alexandria 
(Interviews: 72, 78 & 84). A District public official regards the regional competition very 
critically:  
This non-poaching agreement has no impact on the ground. It is just a phrase. We have a severe 
competition in the Washington, D.C. region that is almost a race-to-the bottom. This competition 
dynamic is counterproductive for the whole region and the lack of regional policy coordination 
is one of the biggest weaknesses of the region (Interview 90). 
The interviewees attribute within competition to the interaction of the two proposed explanatory 
factors. First, the Washington, D.C. region is a typical case of high vertical institutional 
fragmentation. Its core, the District of Columbia, only accounts for about 10% of the population. 
Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia have different political 
histories and institutions (Interviews: 71 & 72). The District of Columbia is a special political 
entity, which has to fulfil the functions of a state and those of a county, a city and a school 
district, without the authority to raise revenue in the way all other states are allowed to (Ghandi 
et al. 2009).  
Second, competition in this metropolitan region can be explained by the interaction between its 
vertical institutional fragmentation and its high local tax autonomy. Each state has different tax 
rules and each jurisdiction can set its own tax rate. This high local tax autonomy enables 
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jurisdictions to offer tax benefits and other financial incentives that provoke a very competitive 
economic dynamic (Interview 89). For example, jurisdictions in Virginia are not allowed to 
levy personal or corporate income tax. However, these Virginian jurisdictions are very 
competitive and aggressive and offer various other incentives to firms, such as reduced real 
estate rents and property tax breaks. Jurisdictions in Maryland are allowed to levy so-called 
piggyback taxes on personal income, which encourages them to prioritize the creation of 
favorable living conditions for their taxpayers (Interviews: 68 & 78). The District of Columbia 
itself has a very different tax setting, since it is not allowed to levy the so-called ‘Commuter 
Tax’ on the income of non-residents that work in the District of Columbia, and federal property 
is tax exempt. In sum, the interaction of these two explanatory factors creates an unlevel playing 
field that fuels competition between the jurisdictions. A public official sum it up: “We can’t 
change anything about the institutional fragmentation and the different tax systems. So, we have 
to accept that and try to work around it” (Interview 66).  
Discussion 
The findings of the case studies are summarized in Table 5. In general, we only found the 
coordination we expected when both explanatory factors either enabled or constrained 
coordination. Mixed directions of influence (high institutional fragmentation and low tax 
autonomy, or vice versa) do not lead to negative coordination. Instead, they result in an absence 
of coordination, which can be considered to be a form of coordination failure.  
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TABLE 5 
Findings of the case studies  
 Washington, D.C. Bern Ottawa-Gatineau  The Hague  
Explanatory 
factors 
- High vertical 
institutional 
fragmentation  
- High local tax 
autonomy 
- Low vertical 
institutional 
fragmentation 
- High local tax 
autonomy 
- Fear of ceding 
local autonomy 
- Partisan divide 
between the core 
and the 
agglomeration 
- High vertical 
institutional 
fragmentation 
- Low local tax 
autonomy 
- Urban/rural divide 
- Low vertical 
institutional 
fragmentation 
- Low local tax 
autonomy 
- Complementary 
economic bases 
Expected 
proposition 
Coordination failure Negative 
coordination 
Negative 
coordination 
Positive 
coordination 
Empirical 
observation  
Coordination failure 
(Beggar-my-
neighbor behavior) 
Coordination failure 
(absence of 
coordination in 
locational policies) 
Coordination failure 
(absence of 
coordination) 
Positive 
coordination 
Proposition 
testing 
Supported Not supported Not supported Supported 
 
Additional explanatory factors are italicized. 
 
Regarding institutional fragmentation, the case studies revealed that second-tier borders, i.e. 
state, province or canton borders, are powerful institutional constraints to the coordination of 
locational policies. The cases of Washington, D.C. and Ottawa-Gatineau show how inter-
municipal coordination fails due to the second-tier borders that divide the SCC region into two 
or more separate political entities. However, as illustrated by the case of Bern, the integration 
of the whole metropolitan region into one single second-tier political entity does not guarantee 
the successful coordination of locational policies. Furthermore, interviewees in Bern and 
Washington, D.C. do not consider horizontal institutional fragmentation, i.e. high numbers of 
local governments, to be a decisive factor that hinders the coordination of locational policies. 
In sum, vertical institutional fragmentation is a powerful constraint to the coordination of 
locational policies. However, it alone does not explain the successful coordination of locational 
policies.  
Regarding local tax autonomy, it seems that the underlying rationale of tax competition, to 
ensure efficient and lean government entities, is at odds with the underlying rationale of 
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coordination as a welfare theoretical concept (Scharpf 1994). More specifically, our cases point 
to an interaction effect between the two institutional factors: High local tax autonomy is an 
obstacle to the coordination of locational policies, but it only unfolds its full negative effect in 
vertically fragmented metropolitan regions. The combination of both institutional factors 
creates an unlevel playing field for local tax competition. The case of Washington, D.C. shows 
that jurisdictions with lower tax autonomy, i.e. fewer tax instruments at hand, compete more 
fiercely to survive this unlevel tax competition. In Washington, D.C., this interaction effect has 
led to beggar-my-neighbor behavior, which can be considered as full coordination failure. Tax 
competition in Bern is comparably moderate, as it is played on a level playing field. Local 
jurisdictions in the Ottawa-Gatineau metropolitan region have different tax settings because of 
vertical institutional fragmentation but limited local tax autonomy prevents fierce (tax) 
competition. This finding supports Leitner’s and Sheppard’s argument: “When cities in 
competition face unequal conditions of possibility [i.e. an unlevel playing field] these not only 
affect the nature of local initiatives but also work to undermine the putative general benefits of 
entrepreneurial strategies: (…), and creating zero-sum or negative-sum game of ‘beggar thy 
neighbor’” (1999, 242). 
These findings can be better understood once we distinguish between coordination as a process 
and policy coherence as the intended outcome of coordination (Cejudo and Michel 2017; 
Nordbeck and Steurer 2016). Whereas low vertical institutional fragmentation enables 
coordination as a process, locational policy coherence only occurs in contexts of low local tax 
autonomy. As the cases of Ottawa-Gatineau and Washington, D.C. demonstrate, vertical 
institutional fragmentation hinders the initiation of coordination because jurisdictions belong to 
different lines of authority. As the case of Bern shows, high local tax autonomy is not 
necessarily an obstacle for coordination. If the jurisdictions involved have high local tax 
autonomy, the coordination process does not result in locational policy coherence because too 
much tax revenue is at stake. Thus, institutional fragmentation can be considered to be the 
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upstream explanatory factor because it is decisive for whether locational policy coordination is 
initiated or not, whereas local tax autonomy can be seen as the downstream explanatory factor, 
it is decisive for whether policy coherence is successfully achieved or not.  
While our article found an interaction effect between the two hard institutional factors, the cases 
also reveal the importance of regional politics. This resonates with the ACI approach, which 
considers institutions to be entangled with actors’ interests and subsequent political behavior. 
In Bern, local decision-makers fear losing the autonomy of their municipality, which is due to 
the fragmented organizational setting. The partisan divide between the core city and the 
municipalities in the agglomeration enhances this fear. In Ottawa-Gatineau, Quebec’s separatist 
movement is an important barrier to coordination. In the case of The Hague, the new 
coordination structure between Rotterdam and The Hague can be viewed as a political power 
play between the province and its two biggest cities. In Washington, D.C., the three states’ 
different political settings, as well as the very special constitutional status of the District of 
Columbia and the nation state’s interests, all aggravate regional coordination.  
Finally, the cities at the heart of this article have very specific functions. Their role as capital 
cities explains why jurisdictions in SCC regions may decide to coordinate their locational 
policies. However, the capital city function cannot serve as a sufficient metropolitan-wide 
integration concept. In Washington, D.C., the regional economy heavily depends on the capital 
city function. For example, locational policies formulated in the District of Columbia and 
Arlington are similar, but the unlevel playing field appears to trump any possible synergy for 
coordinating locational policies. Neither the capital city function, nor the common threat of 
federal government downsizing, has led to a coordinated locational policies agenda. In contrast, 
The Hague and Rotterdam possess two complementary economic bases, which enable the 
establishment of coordination structures at the metropolitan level. 
29 
Conclusion 
The motivation of this article is to identify the specific need for coordinating locational policies 
in secondary capital cities (SCCs), defined as capitals that are not the primary economic city of 
their nation states. SCCs serve as the political center of their nations, but they must 
simultaneously find ways to develop their regional economies. Locational policies, and their 
regional coordination, are the main policy instruments available for strengthening the economic 
competitiveness of a metropolitan region. We derived a theoretical framework with two 
institutionalist explanatory factors for coordination and we expected that high institutional 
fragmentation and high local tax autonomy would aggravate the coordination of locational 
policies in a SCC metropolitan region. 
Our article compares four SCC regions taken from a population of ten SCCs in Western 
countries. The comparison of Bern, Ottawa-Gatineau, The Hague and Washington, D.C. 
suggests that the combination of vertical institutional fragmentation and local tax autonomy 
explains the success or failure of the coordination of locational policies. Local tax autonomy 
has the greatest negative effect on coordination in vertical institutional fragmented metropolitan 
regions because this combination creates an unlevel playing field for tax competition. However, 
as initially expected, no institutional determinism is at work. Coordination is a matter of politics 
just as much as it is formed by institutional context. Urban and regional politics seems to be 
contingent on their institutional setting. Institutions allot decision-making power and coin actor 
identities, both of which determine actors’ interests and behaviour. 
These findings are a piece of bad news for SCCs because they tend to be located in metropolitan 
regions with vertical institutional fragmentation and have capital city-specific local tax 
autonomy constraints, making the regional tax playing field unlevel. Furthermore, the capital 
city function has not been found to serve as a metropolitan-wide locational policy integration 
concept. Therefore, we propose several recommendations to facilitate the coordination of 
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locational policies in SCCs. First, the findings indicate that second-tier political entities, such 
as states, provinces or cantons, can emulate institutional consolidation, which supports inter-
municipal coordination. Second, coordination comes with a political price tag. In order to foster 
coordination, the SCC region should have a common problem understanding that is accepted 
by all coordinating actors and that goes beyond the capital city function. Third, SCCs have an 
ace up their sleeve and may not realize it. The capital city function is a good argument for 
treating SCCs well. If the central government is reminded of the importance of having a well-
functioning capital, it may direct resources to coordinating bodies within SCCs instead of to 
provinces or cities.  
The institutional framework that we derived from theory serves as a simple but powerful 
research heuristic for analyzing coordination in metropolitan regions in general. Other types of 
secondary cities are also pressured to enter interurban competition by devising locational 
policies. Given the transboundary characteristic of locational policies, secondary city regions 
are likely to struggle with coordinating locational policies when there is vertical institutional 
fragmentation and high local tax autonomy.  
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Figure captions: 
FIGURE 1  
Maps of the selected SCCs’ metropolitan regions  
Note: These maps were created by Alexander Hermann (University of Bern) and were first 
published in the book Mayer, Heike, Fritz Sager, David Kaufmann, and Martin Warland. 
2018. The Political Economy of Capital Cities. London: Routledge. The maps are reprinted by 
permission of the copyright holders Alexander Hermann and Heike Mayer. 
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